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SUPRESSING DAMAGES IN
INVOLUNTARY PARENTHOOD
ACTIONS: CONTORTING TORT LAW,
DENYING REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
AND DISCRIMINATING AGAINST
MOTHERS
Bruce Feldthusen*
Abstract: “Involuntary parenthood” actions are negligence
actions, usually medical malpractice cases involving a failed
sterilization, inadequate warning about the risks of pregnancy,
or a failed abortion. In Canada, they will soon also involve
product liability claims against negligent birth control
manufacturers, providers and regulators. This article considers
whether the parents’ damages ought to include the cost of
raising the child. No Canadian appellate court has ever ruled
on this point, although it has been adjudicated extensively by
the highest courts elsewhere in the common law world. At least
7 different rules limiting such recovery have been endorsed in
the Canadian lower courts. Most of the limiting rules are
unique to involuntary parenthood cases, deviating from the
outcome that would prevail were the standard rules of
negligence law applied. Many have no rational foundation.
This article concludes that the failure to compensate parents
for the cost of raising the child cannot be justified. Rather the
refusal to compensate for reasonable child rearing expenses
constitutes discrimination against parents, especially women
who are mothers. This discrimination is sometimes, perhaps
often, perpetrated by judges who refuse to accept and protect a
woman’s right to reproductive freedom. These mothers are
*
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under-compensated, and the medical establishment that failed
them is under-deterred.
INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the ambiguous and unsettled state of
Canadian tort law in cases of “involuntary parenthood.” More
specifically, it concentrates on the various and inconsistent
rules regarding whether parents may recover for the cost of
rearing a child born of an involuntary pregnancy; if so, on what
basis and to what extent; and if not, why not.
The scope of recoverable damages for “involuntary
parenthood” has generated many controversial judicial
decisions from the highest courts in the common law world.1
Yet the issue has not been ruled on by a single Canadian
appellate court outside Quebec, let alone considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada.2 This is probably about to change.
Several Canadian law firms have launched class actions
relating to a problem with Alysena birth control pills. Product
lots containing extra placebo pills in place of active pills

1

In the past 15 years, there have been two decisions from the UKHL:
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, [2000] 2 AC 59, [1999] 4 All ER
961 [McFarlane]; and Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS
Trust, [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309 [Rees]. There has been one
from the High Court of Australia where the majority rejects the
holding in both UK cases: Cattanach v Melchior, [2003] HCA 38,
(2003), 199 ALR 131 [Cattanach]. There has been lively debate
among in the judges in each case.

2

Nor has there been a flood of reported trial decisions. Possibly the
stakes have been too low to support the cost of appellate litigation.
Only a few cases have awarded damages for the cost of raising a
healthy child, and if they did, at present an award of $150,000 for the
cost of rearing the child would be considered generous. See infra note
98.
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reached the market. Involuntary births may have resulted.3
Suddenly, settling the parameters for damages in involuntary
parenthood cases has become a pressing question.
Involuntary parenthood cases include cases that have
been traditionally described as either “wrongful pregnancy” or
“wrongful birth” cases. In Kealey v. Berezowski, Lax J
explained the distinction between “wrongful birth” and
“wrongful pregnancy” cases as follows:4
In a wrongful pregnancy case the act is always
pre-conception. The claimants are parents who
allege that the defendant's negligence has caused
an unwanted pregnancy and birth. The
negligence often occurs through a failed
sterilization or through the preparation or
dispensing of a contraceptive medication. The
claim has been advanced for children born
healthy and for those born unhealthy. In either
case, the child is unplanned. Courts have
recognized the viability of this claim which may
be advanced in contract or tort, although it is
more usually advanced in tort. Courts have
diverged on the appropriate measure of
damages.
A "wrongful birth" case normally arises in an
action instituted by parents of a child who is
3

See Alysena Birth Control/Apotex Inc. Class Action, online: Watkins
Law Professional Corporation <http://www.watkinslawforthe
people.com>; and Alysena Birth Control Class Action, online:
Merchant Law Group LLP <https://www.merchantlaw.com>. This
author has done some consulting on one of these files with a
plaintiffs’ firm.

4

Kealey v Berezowski, [1996] OJ No 2460, 30 OR (3d) 37 [Kealey] at
para 37-38.
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born with birth defects as a result of a planned
pregnancy. The legal basis for the cause of
action derives from the post-conception
interference by the tortfeasor with the mother's
lawful right to terminate the pregnancy had an
informed decision been available to her.
It turns out that these traditional categories are not
necessary for present purposes. Although these labels are wellestablished and descriptively accurate, there is no reason to
treat the parents’ claims for the cost of child rearing in
“wrongful pregnancy” cases differently from how such claims
are treated in the “wrongful birth” cases. The courts do not
differentiate between them on damage questions. Judges move
seamlessly from one line of authority to the other when
reviewing the state of the law. Instead, this article will employ
Professor Adjin-Tettey’s term, “involuntary parenthood” to
encompass both “wrongful pregnancy” and “wrongful birth.”5
It is possible, however, that the distinction between
pre- and post-conception negligence will remain important in
the entirely different sort of claim for “wrongful life” with
which the involuntary parenthood claims are often confused.
“Wrongful life” claims were described in Kealey as follows:6
“Wrongful life” claims . . . are normally
advanced by the infant plaintiff or on his or her
behalf and sometimes together with a derivative
claim by the parents. These claims can arise pre5

See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Claims of Involuntary Parenthood: Why
the Resistance?” in Jason Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen
Pitel, eds, Emerging Issues in Tort Law, (Portland: Hart Publishing,
2007) 85 at 85-6. See generally Dean Stretton, “The Birth Torts:
Damages for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life” (2005) 10 Deakin L
Rev 319.

6

Kealey, supra note 4 at para 37.
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conception as in the case of a failed sterilization
or post-conception as in the case of a failed
abortion or improper genetic screening. A
"wrongful life" claim alleges that the tortfeasor,
invariably a physician, owes a duty of care to the
child which is breached by the physician's
failure to give the child's parents the opportunity
to terminate his or her life.
It is critical to distinguish the parents’ “wrongful
pregnancy” or “wrongful birth” claims from the child’s own
claim for “wrongful life.” No Canadian court has ever
recognized a child’s independent cause of action for “wrongful
life,” although the question is actively open today, at least in
Ontario.7 Some of the objections to recognizing a “wrongful
7

Claims by a child based on pre-conception negligence have been
rejected twice in Ontario. See Paxton v Ramji, 2008 ONCA 697, 92
OR (3d) 401 and Bovingdon v Hergott, 2008 ONCA 2, 88 OR (3d)
641. The courts preferred to take a standard “novel duty” approach
rather than to employ the “wrongful life” label and the baggage that
accompanies that label. In Liebig (Litigation Guardian of) v Guelph
General Hospital, 2010 ONCA 450, [2010] OJ No 2580 [Liebig] the
court confirmed that the decisions in Paxton and Bovingdon had not
altered “. . . the very long and well-established line of cases. . . ,
holding that an infant, once born alive, may sue for damages
sustained as a result of the negligence of health care providers during
labour and delivery [emphasis added].” The open question concerns
cases that arise from the factual circumstances captured by the
“wrongful birth” cases, but not the “wrongful pregnancy cases”
where the negligence occurs post-conception, but prior to labour and
delivery. In McDonald-Wright (Litigation guardian of) v O'Herlihy,
[2005] OJ No. 1636, 75 OR (3d) 261 such a claim was not struck out,
but failed on the issue of standard of care. The consequences of
refusing to allow the child to recover are cushioned in a jurisdiction
that allows the parents to recover child rearing costs fully, or for
exceptional child care costs related to a child born with a disability.
However, the question of whether the parents may recover for care
expenses expected to be incurred after the child reaches the age of

16
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life” claim arise from quantification difficulties similar to those
raised in the parental clams. However, the two core concerns in
“wrongful life” are unique to the child’s claim. In Canada
especially, there is a concern about the possibility that
conflicting duties of care to the mother and to the child might
arise if the child’s “wrongful life” claim were recognized.8
Second, there is a judicial aversion to regarding the birth of a
child, particularly one’s own birth, as a legal wrong. Neither of
these concerns applies to “involuntary parenthood” actions
which deal with the parents’ claims for losses they suffer when
their rights of “reproductive autonomy” are breached.9
Nevertheless, one suspects that the failure to distinguish clearly
the child’s claim for wrongful birth from the parents’ claim for
involuntary pregnancy has prejudiced the parental plaintiffs.
“Involuntary parenthood” actions are negligence
actions. To date, the Canadian cases have all been medical
malpractice cases. The typical involuntary parenthood case has
involved a failed sterilization, inadequate warning about the
risks of pregnancy, or a failed abortion.10 There is no logical

majority is unsettled. If the parents cannot recover these projected
post-majority costs, this may be an unmet need for the child. Parents
were allowed to recover a small percentage of projected care costs
after the child reached the age of majority in Krangle (Guardian ad
litem of) v Brisco, [1997] BCJ No 2740, 154 DLR (4th) 707
[Krangle], approved in Bovingdon at para 85. This was a contingency
should the child not be placed in publically funded care as expected.
See also Kealey, supra note 4 at para 98, and Petkovic (Litigation
guardian of) v Olupona, [2002] OJ No 1269 where a motion to strike
out a claim by the child for care costs in adulthood was dismissed.
8

See e.g. Paxton, Bovingdon, & Leibig, ibid.

9

This term is also used by Adjin-Tettey, supra note 5 at 85.

10

A comprehensive and detailed breakdown is offered by Sanda
Rodgers, “A Mother’s Loss Is the Price of Parenthood: The Failure of
Tort Law to Recognize Birth as Compensable Reproductive Injury”
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reason why the damage rules for involuntary parenthood
should be any different in a medical malpractice case than they
would be in a class action based on a defective product such as
the one involving Alysena.
There are at least seven different approaches to govern
the recovery of the cost of rearing the child in an involuntary
parenthood claim that enjoy some judicial support in Canada.11
Taking the Australian and UK positions into account, there is
overwhelming support for allowing the parents to recover for at
least some costs related directly to the birth and pregnancy
itself. In addition, most courts favour recovery for special care
costs related to rearing a child born with a disability. Recent
cases have allowed at least limited recovery for the cost of
rearing a healthy child. However, there is no single clear
position in Canada. Obviously, there must be something special
about reproductive autonomy to have turned an otherwise
simple variant of settled medical malpractice law into such a
jumble.
This article examines and evaluates why so many
judges refuse to award full compensation for the foreseeable
cost of rearing a child, whether healthy or born with a
disability. It examines a series of arguments that have been
relied upon to defeat or limit the parents’ claims. First, it
considers the argument that the birth of a child does not
constitute a compensable loss. It then considers the modified
position that the birth of a healthy child does not constitute a
loss, but the birth of a child born with a disability does. Next it
(2009) 44 SCLR (2d) 161 at 164-5. See also Adjin-Tettey, supra note
5 at 86-7.
11

In Bevilacqua v Altenkirk, 2004 BCSC 945, [2004] BCJ No 1473
[Bevilacqua], the court identified four such possibilities at paras 8487, derived from the three identified in Kealey, supra note 4 at para
96. See also the five options identified by Kirby J in Cattanach, supra
note 1 at para 235.

18
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considers several arguments that purport to accept the full
recovery model, but in effect collapse into much more
restrictive positions. Finally, it reviews two highly unusual
compromise positions – the conventional sum and nonpecuniary loss approaches. The article will conclude that the
various refusals to allow or to limit compensation for the cost
of rearing the child cannot be justified. Parents should be
permitted to recover damages related to the pregnancy and
birth itself and also damages for the full costs of raising the
child whether born healthy or born with a disability.
Foreseeability of loss should be the governing concept as it is
in other malpractice cases. This position represents the view of
the majority of the Australian High Court,12 and has also been
adopted in New Brunswick.13

12

Cattanach, supra note 1. The result was subsequently modified by
legislation in three Australian states, essentially to restrict recovery to
the extra cost of raising a child born with a disability. The Civil
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 71 prohibits recovery for the cost of
rearing a healthy child, but allows recovery (except for associated
loss of earnings) for additional losses associated with raising a child
born with a disability. The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 49A and
49B also excludes damages related to the cost of raising a healthy
child. However, the exclusion only applies to a child born as a result
of a failed contraceptive or sterilisation procedure (emphasis added),
not an IVF procedure or antenatal negligence. It may not cover a
product liability claim based on defective birth control. The Civil
Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 67 precludes recovery for the costs of
rearing a healthy child only, and this prohibition also applies to
product liability claims.

13

Stockford v Johnston Estate, 2008 NBQB 118, [2008] NBJ No 122
[Stockford]. See also MS v Baker, 2001 ABQB 1032, [2001] AJ No
1579. The child had serious health problems for the first five years,
and was healthy thereafter. The court apparently approved full
recovery applying the scope of the risk test from Kealey, supra note
4. This was in obiter because the plaintiff failed to establish
negligence.
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NO RECOVERY FOR THE COST OF REARING A
HEALTHY CHILD
At one end of the spectrum is the approach that holds that the
cost of rearing a child is not a compensable head of damages.
Under this approach both parents14 may recover damages for
their own losses associated with the pregnancy and childbirth
itself, such as lost income, out-of-pocket expenses, and medical
expenses.15 However, nothing is awarded for the cost of raising
the child. This restriction is usually supported by observations
about the inherent value of human life and the social
importance of the family. One Alberta judge, in obiter, has

14

The Canadian courts routinely allow the father to recover for his own
losses relating to the birth and pregnancy itself. The few overt
challenges to the father’s right to claim have been rejected. See e.g.
RH v Hunter, [1996] OJ No. 4477 [Hunter] at paras 22 - 31; Krangle,
supra note 7 at para 117. A stand-alone claim by the father was
dismissed in Freeman v Sutter, [1996] MJ No 246 (CA), the court
holding that the father’s claim must be derivative of the mother’s. In
some jurisdictions the father may be permitted to claim damages for
loss of consortium. See e.g. Cattanach, supra note 1 where the
mother claimed all the direct costs related to the pregnancy, the father
claimed for loss of consortium, and they claimed jointly for the cost
of raising the child.

15

An example of what these damages might consist is found in Kealey,
supra note 4 at para 96:
Having regard to the unplanned pregnancy exacerbated by the
round ligament strain, the stress and difficulty of caring for two
young children and working full-time during this pregnancy, the
labour and delivery, and the re-sterilization, all necessitated by
the defendant's negligence, I award general damages of $30,000.
To date there is no clear position about an entitlement to
damages for opportunity costs incurred by a parent choosing to
leave the workforce to care for the child.

20

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 29, 2014]

expressed a preference for this position.16
The “no recovery” position takes various shapes. Its
distinguishing feature is the premise, often stated as if it were
self-evident, that it is wrong for society to award monetary
damages which attempt to reflect the value/cost of human life.
In addition to the implicit philosophical and religious bases of
such a position, some judges offer nothing more than a moral
hunch to support denying the parents’ claim for the cost of
rearing the child. The judge may refer to the various ways in
which the state demonstrates the importance of human life and
its support for families and child rearing.17 Some judges have
propped up this argument by observing that such damages
would be unpopular with the mythical public transit
passenger.18 Others say the action commodifies the value of the
child’s life. Still others may go so far as to declare that
awarding such damages would be repugnant.19 In their pure
form, these arguments lead to the conclusion that no damages
whatsoever should be allowed for child-rearing expenses.
In Rees, L Steyn quoted with approval the following
words of L Millet in McFarlane:20
16

MY v Boutros, 2002 ABQB 362, [2002] AJ No 480. The court would
not have allowed recovery for cost of rearing a healthy child, or
recovery for the additional exceptional expenses of raising a child
born with a disability.

17

See e.g. Kealey, supra note 4 at 62. “The birth of a child is a
blessing” is a related argument, discussed below under offsetting
benefits.

18

See e.g. L Hutton in Rees, supra note 1 at para 89 quoting Lady Hale
in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust,
[2002] QB 266 (CA) [Parkinson]; Kirby J in Cattanach, supra note 1
at para 135 criticizing L Steyn in Parkinson.

19

See generally Adjin-Tettey, supra note 5 at 103-109.

20

L Steyn in Rees supra note 1 at para 28. He went on to say:
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In my opinion the law must take the birth of a
normal, healthy baby to be a blessing, not a
detriment. In truth it is a mixed blessing. It
brings joy and sorrow, blessing and
responsibility. The advantages and the
disadvantages are inseparable. Individuals may
choose to regard the balance as unfavourable
and take steps to forgo the pleasures as well as
the responsibilities of parenthood. They are
entitled to decide for themselves where their
own interests lie. But society itself must regard
the balance as beneficial. It would be repugnant
to its own sense of values to do otherwise. It is
morally offensive to regard a normal, healthy
baby as more trouble and expense than it is
worth [Emphasis added by L Steyn].
The fatal weakness of this line of argument is that there
is no logical connection between the value of human life as
society must weigh it (assuming it must), and the parents’
medical malpractice claim for pecuniary damages.21 McHugh
and Gummow JJ put this well in Cattanach:22
First, are the underlying values respecting the
importance of human life, the stability of the
These I believe to be themes which led the Law Lords sitting in
the case to reject the claim for the cost of bringing up the healthy
child (in McFarlane): see Lord Slynn of Hadley, at 75C and 76C;
my judgment, at 83D-E; Lord Hope of Craighead, at 97C-D;
Lord Clyde, at 103 B-D; Lord Millett, at 111C-D.
21

If there is a rational connection, it would be that assisting parents with
the expenses of child rearing would support, not violate, these
essential values.

22

Cattanach, supra note 1 at para 767. See also J K Mason, "A Turn-up
Down Under: McFarlane in the Light of Cattanach", (2004) 1:1
SCRIPTed 119.

22
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family unit and the nurture of infant children
until their legal majority an essential aspect of
the corporate welfare of the community?
Secondly, if they are, can it be said there is a
general recognition in the community that those
values demand that there must be no award of
damages for the cost to the parents of rearing
and maintaining a child who would not have
been born were it not for the negligent failure of
a gynaecologist in giving advice after
performing a sterilisation procedure?
Allowing an affirmative answer to the first
question, nevertheless the answer to the second
must be that the courts can perceive no such
general recognition that those in the position of
Mr. and Mrs. Melchior should be denied the full
remedies the common law of Australia
otherwise affords them. It is a beguiling but
misleading simplicity to invoke the broad values
which few would deny and then glide to the
conclusion that they operate to shield the
appellants from the full consequences in law of
Dr. Cattanach's negligence.
How can one explain why some judges continue to
deny the parents’ claim in the absence of a rational connection
between the trumpeted core values and the parents’ claim?
Possibly some proponents of the inherent value of life have
wrongly conflated objections to a child’s wrongful life claim
with objections to involuntary parenthood claims. Involuntary
parenthood claims do not value the worth of the child. It is true
that at the time of the operative negligence, whether pre- or
post-conception, the mother did not wish to become or remain
pregnant. The action deals with the consequences to the parents
of a pregnancy that was unwanted at the time the tort was
committed. The guiding principle of tort damages is restitutio
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in integrum – put the parents in the position they would have
been in had the tort not been committed. The “had the tort not
been committed” point of reference arises long before the child
is born. It is not necessarily true, or even more likely than not
to be true, that by the time of the birth or afterwards the child is
an unwanted child. Once the unwanted pregnancy is
established and accepted as a matter of fact, and certainly once
the child is born, the child may well be a wanted child.
Recovery should not depend on whether the child is loved or
loathed. The wrong is rooted in the damage to the mother’s
right to reproductive autonomy. There is nothing inherent in
the “involuntary parenthood” action that requires that the
parents have an objection of any sort to the child who is
eventually born. There is nothing about the “involuntary
parenthood” action that suggests that the parents are seeking
damages for a “wrongful child.”
The right of a woman, or a woman and her partner
acting in concert, to make reproductive choices lies at the core
of the involuntary parenthood action. Lord Bingham put it
more broadly saying the mother’s interest is “the opportunity to
live her life in the way that she wished and planned.” 23 The
involuntary parenthood action deals with the parents’ claim to
recover pecuniary damages they suffer as the result of
negligently inflicted damage to their right to reproductive
autonomy. It is quite possible that the “inherent value of human
life” rhetoric is simply a device employed to constrain
reproductive autonomy. There is arguably a rational connection
between these core values and the background facts of
involuntary parenthood such as abortion and sterilization.
Having failed to outlaw reproductive autonomy, this is a line of
argument that would appeal to judges who wish to constrain it.
In Canada, Australia and the UK, a woman has a right,
however constrained in practice, to use birth control, to
23

Rees, supra note 1 at para 8.
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undergo sterilization and to undergo an abortion.24 Some
judges in Australia and the UK have argued that these are not
“rights,” but merely “freedoms.”25 This can only mean that
these judges believe that the mother is entitled to consume
these medical services (the freedom), but has no right to full
compensation if the medical services are performed
negligently. There are people who object to the existence and
exercise of some or all aspects of reproductive autonomy.
Included among them are judges, some of whom allow their
objections to influence their judgment in involuntary
parenthood cases. If they insist on limiting the reproductive
autonomy of women and families, they should do so explicitly
and justify their position openly. It is disingenuous to pay lip
service to reproductive freedom and to simultaneously gut it.26
There are numerous reasons why a woman and her
partner might wish to prevent pregnancy or birth. They may
involve health concerns for the mother or the putative child.
They may involve financial or lifestyle concerns. One partner’s
reasons may differ from the others. Decisions may be based on
all these factors and more. Some observers may believe that
they would have made a different choice in the same
circumstances. Others may feel the mother’s choice was
irrational, or repugnant. Provided the exercise of reproductive
autonomy is lawful, which it should be as part of the right to
bodily autonomy, the mother is entitled to make it. The law
should be compelled to respect a woman’s reproductive
24

See e.g. Kealey, supra note 4 at para 59; Cattanach, supra note 1 per
Gleeson CJ at para 3 and 8, and per McHugh & Gummow JJ at para
66; Rees, supra note 1 per L Bingham at para 8, and per L Millet at
para 123.

25

See Cattanach, supra note 1 per Gleeson CJ at para 23; Rees, supra
note 1 per L Hope at para 70.

26

For example, contrast the words of Gleeson CJ in Cattanach, supra
note 1 at paras 3 and 8 with his comment in para 23.
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autonomy in the same way as it protects bodily autonomy and
integrity. One entirely foreseeable consequence of the wrong is
that the parents are now incurring the cost of rearing a child
that they would not have incurred but for the medical
negligence. Ordinarily the law of torts would attempt to make
an award of damages that would put the parents in the position
they would have been in had the tort not been committed, as far
as money is able to do so.
The departure from the ordinary rules of negligence
law is a common characteristic in involuntary parenthood
cases. Prima facie, negligent defendants ought to be held fully
liable for all reasonably foreseeable loss to foreseeable
plaintiffs caused by their negligent breach of their duty of
care.27 Involuntary parenthood actions are, after all, negligence
actions that fall within a well-recognized sub-category, medical
malpractice. The courts may properly determine that the
ordinary rules of negligence law must be abrogated or modified
in a particular type of case. However, we should be very wary
when they do so. The law of negligence is replete with rules
and exceptions applied in an unjustified and discriminatory
fashion to the detriment of women and members of minority
groups.28 Involuntary parenthood actions deal primarily with
27

See per L Hutton in Rees, supra note 1 at para 98. See also AdjinTettey, supra note 5 at paras 87, 90, and 92. At para 100 the author
points out that foreseeability is the rule in other medical malpractice
cases based on the loss of patient autonomy. The “ambit of the
wrongdoing” challenge to foreseeability is discussed below.

28

Adjin-Tettey, supra note 5, effectively employs gender discrimination
as the lens with which to view the courts’ failure to compensate for
child rearing costs. She has published other analyses of gender
discrimination in tort law. See e.g. “Discriminatory Impact of
Application of Restitutio in Integrum in Personal Injury Claims” in
Justice Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, eds, Taking Remedies Seriously
(Ottawa: CIAJ, 2010) 119; “Sexual Wrongdoing: Do the Remedies
Reflect the Wrong?” in Janice Richardson & Erika Rackley, eds,
Feminist Perspectives on Tort Law (New York: Routledge, 2012);

26
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the uniquely female aspects of reproductive autonomy and with
damage inflicted on mothers.29 The refusal to compensate for
the quantifiable and foreseeable costs of rearing a child
discriminates against parents, but especially against women
who are mothers.30 Such discrimination requires a convincing
justification.

and “Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal Injury
Claims through Female Specific Contingencies” (2004) 49 McGill L
J 309. See also Rodgers, supra note 10; Bruce Feldthusen,
"Discriminatory Damage Quantification in Civil Actions for Sexual
Battery" (1994) 44 UTLJ 133 (failure to recognize pecuniary losses
suffered by female plaintiffs in civil sexual battery cases); and Bruce
Feldthusen, “Civil Liability for Sexual Assault in Aboriginal
Residential Schools: The Baker Did It” (2007) 22 CJLS 61 (failure to
apply standard rules imposing joint and several liability for
indivisible harm).
29

Fathers may also recover, but the father’s claim is derivative of the
mother’s. See Freeman v Sutter, supra note 14.

30

Women with children are an especially vulnerable group. See Xuelin
Zhang, “Earnings of Women With and Without Children” (2009)
10:3
Perspectives
on
Labour
and
Income
5
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2009103/article/10823eng.htm> accessed 6 Aug 2014. Women spend about twice the time
doing unpaid child care as do men. See Anne Milan, Leslie-Ann
Keown & Covadonga Robles Urquijo, “Families, Living
Arrangements and Unpaid Work”, in Statistics Canada, Women in
Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report, Catalogue No 89-503-X
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2011) <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89503-x/2010001/article/11546-eng.pdf> accessed 6 Aug 2014.
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ONLY EXCEPTIONAL CARE COSTS ALLOWED FOR
CHILD BORN WITH A DISABILITY31
A widely favoured exception to the pure “no recovery” position
allows, in addition to the costs related to the pregnancy itself,
damages for the extra care costs related to the special needs of
a child born with a disability. Under this approach, damages for
the cost of raising a healthy child remain unrecoverable. This
exceptional treatment in the case of a child born with a
disability is probably the law in the UK.32 Several Canadian
courts have supported this position.33 This is also the statutory
rule in three Australian states.34
The popularity of the disability exception is not
surprising. The damages claimed are familiar to our legal
31

As explained below, the use of terms such as “born with a disability”
versus “healthy child” is unnecessary and every attempt to avoid this
terminology has been made herein. The use of the terms “disabled
child,” and “normal child,” quite common in the UK and Australia
one assumes from Rees, supra note 1 and Cattanach supra note 1, is
less common in Canada where it would usually be regarded as
offensive.

32

This was the rule established in Parkinson, supra note 18. It appears
this is still the law in the UK after Rees, supra note 1. This is
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 74-81.

33

Cherry (Guardian ad litem of) v Borsman, [1992] BCJ No 1687, 16
BCAC 93; Joshi (Guardian ad litem of) v Wooley, [1995] BCJ No
113, 4 BCLR (3d) 208. Such recovery was approved in Kealey, supra
note 4, but without necessarily ruling out recovery for the cost of
raising a healthy child in an appropriate case. See infra notes 42-48
and accompanying text. The right to recover the cost of exceptional
care was conceded, and the further right of the parents to recover for
the cost of exceptional care after the child reached the age of majority
was approved in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bovingdon v Hergott,
supra note 7.

34

Supra note 12.
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system. They will resemble those routinely claimed in a serious
personal injury case. The costs that the parents will incur are
apparent and possibly enormous. No caring society should let
those costs fall where they land by chance, let alone when they
arise from medical misadventure. The question is not why the
law allows recovery for the costs of meeting special needs, but
rather why it does not also compensate the logically identical
costs of rearing a so-called healthy or normal child.
Several judges have observed, quite properly, that the
law ought not to distinguish between the worth of a healthy
child and a child born with a disability. Fortunately, it is not
necessary to do so. It is an error to describe the results of
involuntary parenthood in such terms, whether recovery is
allowed or not. What is in issue is the right to recover damages
for the cost raising a child. What is not in issue is the value of
the child. The point is not whether the child was born with a
disability. The point is not whether the child has a formally
recognized disability. The point is what it will cost to provide
the requisite level of care for the child. The basic costs of
rearing a child will vary according to each child’s needs. It
costs more to feed, house, clothe and educate some children
than others. It is superfluous, demeaning and misleading to
identify the child as having been born with a disability, let
alone as being disabled, for the purposes of awarding damages
in an involuntary parenthood action.
One could try to justify the distinction between “basic”
and “special” child rearing expenses on the basis of quantum.
The basic costs are surprisingly modest.35 The parents’
expenses and the corresponding damage awards are likely to be
larger, much larger, in the case of special needs. Such a
distinction would work like catastrophic loss insurance, with a
large deductible for the cost or rearing a healthy child.
Arguably this is a rational response to the social problem of
35

Infra note 97.
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involuntary parenthood. But it is not a common law tort,
corrective justice approach. It is an exceptional approach
dependent on an unnecessary exercise of discrimination.
One could try to justify the distinction between “basic”
and “special” child-rearing expenses on the basis of credibility
in proof of loss. Lax J in Kealey attempts to do this:36
Moreover, to draw a distinction between
children born with disabilities and those born
healthy seems wrong. Every life has value. But,
the financial and emotional burdens imposed on
parents who are charged with the responsibility
of caring for a disabled child are far more
apparent to me than the financial and emotional
burdens imposed on the Kealeys here. I do not
think that this is merely a question of the
measure of damages. Rather, it goes to the
question of whether or not there is in fact an
injury to redress.
Evidently, Lax J’s view was that happy families do not
experience a loss when deprived of their reproductive
autonomy.
L Millet was perhaps more candid when he expressed
the following view in Rees:37
A disabled child is not “worth” less than a
36

Kealey, supra note 4 at para 97.

37

McFarlane, supra note 1 at para 112. L Millet did not find it
necessary to resolve whether parents of children born with disabilities
should be able to recover their extra costs over and beyond the
£15,000 conventional sum he awarded to the parent of a healthy
child. The conventional sum approach is discussed immediately
below.
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healthy one. The blessings of his or her birth are
no less incalculable. Society must equally
“regard the balance as beneficial.” But the law
does not develop by strict logic; and most people
would instinctively feel that there was a
difference, even if they had difficulty in
articulating it. Told that a friend has given birth
to a normal, healthy baby, we would express
relief as well as joy. Told that she had given
birth to a seriously disabled child, most of us
would feel (though not express) sympathy for
the parents. Our joy at the birth would not be
unalloyed; it would be tinged with sorrow for
the child's disability. Speaking for myself, I
would not find it morally offensive to reflect this
difference in an award of compensation that the
birth of a child born with a disability would
generate.
These remarks appear to transcend the question of
parental care costs and focus on the injury to the child per se.
Perhaps L Millet is dealing with what he suspects are the nonpecuniary detriments of raising a child born with a disability?
Interestingly, neither he nor anyone else has been prepared to
consider explicitly the “setoff of benefits” approach in the case
of children with need for special care.
There is no valid justification for distinguishing care
costs on the basis of disability. McHugh and Gummow JJ put it
well in Cattanach:38
The reliance upon values respecting the
importance of life is made implausible by the
reference to the postulated child as “healthy.”
The differential treatment of the worth of the
38

Cattanach, supra note 1 at para 78.
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lives of those with ill health or disabilities has
been a mark of the societies and political
regimes we least admire. To prevent recovery in
respect of one class of child but not the other, by
reference to a criterion of health, would be to
discriminate by reference to a distinction
irrelevant to the object sought to be achieved,
the award of compensatory damages to the
parents.
The only purpose served by dividing recoverable
damages into two categories – child-rearing costs for healthy
children and child-rearing costs for so-called disabled children
– is to preserve a rule that denies recovery for the costs of
rearing a healthy child. The justifications for refusing to
compensate for the ordinary costs of care are inadequate. If the
law simply allowed recovery for the costs of rearing any child
born from an involuntary parenthood, the need to discriminate
on the ground of disability, however benevolent it may seem,
would disappear.39
FULL RECOVERY WITHIN THE “AMBIT OF
WRONGDOING”
There are several judicial approaches to child-rearing damages
for wrongful pregnancy that give nominal approval to full
recovery under the basic rules of tort law. However, the “pure
full recovery” approach has only been approved in two

39

Admittedly, the view that nothing should ever be awarded for the cost
of child-rearing regardless of whether the child is born healthy or
with a disability is equally logical. For all the reasons given earlier, it
is also utterly flawed.
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jurisdictions: Australia40 and New Brunswick.41 In the other
examples the courts impose limits to full recovery not
ordinarily employed elsewhere in negligence law.
The “ambit of recovery” line of argument rejects
“foreseeability” as the standard limiting rule to bound recovery
for involuntary parenthood. Instead, it posits that claims to
recover the cost of rearing the child are claims for pure
economic loss. It concludes that ordinary negligence law
governing economic loss would employ a different limiting
rule than foreseeability, and restrict recovery to losses that fell
within the “ambit of the wrongdoing.”
This “ambit of recovery” approach was first proposed
by Lax J in Kealey:42
Although courts which have considered
wrongful pregnancy cases have purported to
follow ordinary principles of negligence law to
allow recovery, a closer analysis of the cases
suggests that, foreseeable or not, damages are by
40

Cattanach, supra note 1. The result was subsequently modified by
legislation in three Australian states, essentially to restrict recovery to
the extra cost of raising a child born with a disability. See supra note
12.

41

Stockford v Johnston Estate, supra note 13. See also MS v Baker,
supra note 13. The child had serious health problems for the first five
years, and was healthy thereafter. The court apparently approved full
recovery applying the scope of the risk test from Kealey, supra note
4. This was in obiter because the plaintiff failed to establish
negligence.

42

This was first approved in Kealey, supra note 4, and followed
subsequently in Hunter, supra note 14 at para 20; and in Mummery v
Olsson, [2001] OJ No 226 [Mummery]. It was approved by L Scott in
Rees, supra note 1 at para 145, but rejected in the same case by L
Millet at para 112.
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and large awarded when the plaintiff is within
the ambit of the defendant's wrongdoing. By this
I mean that the consequences of the failed
sterilization causes [sic] an actual impairment to
the interest which the sterilization sought to
protect. In my view, this is evident from each of
the seminal wrongful pregnancy cases resulting
in the birth of a healthy child in the United
States, England and Canada.
According to this line of argument, a mother who had
undergone a failed sterilization might recover the cost of
rearing a healthy child if the purpose of sterilization had been
to protect her from the economic consequences of pregnancy.43
On the other hand, a mother who sought sterilization to avoid a
child being born with a hereditary disease would not, on this
theory, have suffered any loss if the child were born without
the disease.44
The “ambit of the wrongdoing” approach from Kealey
has been employed in Ontario to permit recovery of
exceptional extra care costs in the case of children born with
43

See also MS v Baker, supra note 13.

44

This example was used by Chamberland J in the Court of Appeal in
Suite c Cooke, [1993] RJQ 514, 15 CCLT (2d) 15 (Sup Ct), aff’d
[1995] RJQ 2765 (CA); and quoted in Kealey, supra note 4 at para
75. In Kealey at para 89 the court said:
I wish to make clear that the result in this case does not finally
determine whether, in all cases, damages for child- rearing costs
are or are not recoverable. This is not a case where a sterilization
was sought to protect a mother's health and the mother became
ill, impairing her ability to care for the child. Nor is it a case
where a sterilization was sought to avoid the transmission of a
hereditary condition and the child was born diseased. This is not
a case of economic necessity, imposing unreasonable financial
burdens on an impoverished family.
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disabilities,45 and to refuse recovery in the case of a healthy
child.46 It was explicitly adopted in the 2008 New Brunswick
decision in Stockford v. Johnston Estate to allow the cost of
raising a healthy child.47 It has not found favour elsewhere in
Canada, or in the UK or Australia.
There are practical shortcomings with the “ambit of the
wrongdoing” approach. How will the court ever discover the
parents’ true motive after the fact, if indeed there was any
common single motive? Self-serving, often unverifiable
testimony is inevitable, from the parents and the defendants.
The prospect of distasteful and symbolically damaging
testimony is a legitimate concern. Similar reasons underlie the
reason for rejecting a purely subjective test of causation in
medical malpractice cases.48
It is probable that financial considerations will be one
consideration among several in involuntary pregnancy cases. A
liberal interpretation of what degree of financial motivation
will meet the ambit of the wrongdoing test could render the
restriction relatively meaningless. The approach in Kealey
raises the opposite concern. Lax J’s judgment would seem to
require the law to distinguish between the “impoverished”49
45

Hunter, supra note 14 at para 20. Liability was based on a failure to
refer the mother to a genetic consultation. The children were born
with multiple sclerosis. The total damage award was almost $3m,
almost $2m for the cost of child rearing. It is unclear whether by
following Kealey the court in Hunter was adopting the “within the
ambit of the wrongdoing” approach, or simply allowing the
exceptional costs of care as recoverable regardless.

46

Mummery, supra note 42. Although it was not an issue in Bovingdon,
supra note 7, the facts are consistent with the ambit of the
wrongdoing test.

47

Supra note 13.

48

Reibl v Hughes, [1980] 2 SCR 880.

49

Kealey, supra note 4 at para 89.
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parents who may recover and the middle class parents who
may not.50 Rules based explicitly on ad hoc considerations of
distributive justice are rare in the common law of torts where
corrective justice usually carries the day. It is curious how they
seem to trump corrective justice in involuntary parenthood
cases.51
There are also doctrinal objections to the “ambit of the
wrongdoing” approach. Most fundamentally is the
characterization of the claim as one for “economic loss.” Here
we may run into an aversion to calling a pregnancy an “injury”
or a “loss.” However, it is difficult to imagine a more
fundamental interference with the primary right to personal
autonomy and integrity that negligence law protects.52 An
unwanted pregnancy is a clear example of a physical as
opposed to an economic intrusion.53 The cost of raising a child
born of an unwanted pregnancy is a consequential economic
loss, consequential on physical interference. It is not a pure
economic loss. Foreseeability, not ambit of the wrongdoing, is
the proper test in such cases.
Even if one were to describe the claim as one for pure
economic loss, which it is not, the ambit of the wrongdoing
approach cannot be justified doctrinally. The approach to
economic loss that attracted Lax J is specific to negligent
50

Lifestyle choices are not respected under this approach.

51

Consider also the concern that liability for ordinary child rearing
costs might damage the National Health Services expressed by Kirby
J in Cattanach, supra note 1 at para 178 and approved by L Bingham
in Rees, supra note 1 at para 6. The amounts at issue are unlikely to
bankrupt any national health service. Nor is a case made for why the
mothers have to subsidize the National Health Service.

52

See Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Portland:
Hart Publishing, 2007) at ch 2.

53

Ibid, at ch 12.
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misrepresentation, a cause of action with a very different
foundation than medical malpractice or other types of
economic loss claims.54 The judge was inspired by an excellent
article written by Professor Chapman analysing a rule of law
established in Canada’s leading negligent misrepresentation
case involving pure economic loss, Hercules Management v.
Ernst & Young.55 The defendants were employed by a
corporation to prepare corporate audits as required under
statute. Shareholders of the corporation foreseeably relied on
the negligently prepared statements to make private investment
decisions. Although the court recognized sufficient proximity
based on this reasonable foreseeability, liability was denied at
the second stage of the Anns framework because of the
possibility of indeterminate liability. The court adopted what is
sometimes called the “end and aim” rule to restrict the scope of
recovery in misrepresentation to losses suffered within the
context of the purpose for which the report was given. The
corporation itself was therefore owed a duty of care. The duty
did not extend to individual shareholders’ private investment
decisions. Courts in other jurisdictions would employ the “end
and aim” test at the proximity stage to define the type of
relationship that would support the duty.56 Although not its
purpose when employed as part of the proximity analysis, the
54

The duty in misrepresentation is based on the defendant’s assumption
of responsibility and the plaintiff’s reliance, and not governed by
Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] AC 462. Some wrongful birth cases,
but not all, can be explained under both approaches. See Gordon T
Houseman, “Wrongful Birth as Negligent Misrepresentation” (2013),
71 UT Fac L Rev 9. The reliance-based duties in misrepresentation
derived from Hedley Byrne v Heller, [1964] AC 465 are entirely
different from those at the heart of other claims for pure economic
loss. See Beever, supra note 52 at ch 12.

55

Hercules Management v Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 SCR 165.

56

Caparo v Dickman, [1990] UKHL 2, [1990] 2 AC 605; and Esanda
Finance Corp v Peat Markwick Hungerfords (1997), 188 CLR 241,
[1997] HCA 8.
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“end and aim rule” effectively eliminates the potential for
indeterminate liability.
Neither proximity nor indeterminacy is problematic in
an involuntary parenthood case. The issues present in Hercules
bear no relationship to those in an involuntary parenthood case.
The type of indeterminacy that has concerned some judges in
involuntary parenthood cases, if it really is an indeterminacy
problem at all, is not addressed by an “ambit of the
wrongdoing” test.57 In addition, the duty in misrepresentation is
one that the defendant voluntarily assumes and ought therefore
to be restricted to precisely what duty was assumed. Even if
one could argue that the duty in an involuntary parenthood case
was voluntarily assumed, the duty so assumed would be
assumed to the mother, and would be the duty to prevent
pregnancy or birth. Preventing pregnancy or birth was the “end
and aim” of the medical service. The cost of raising the child
falls precisely within the ambit of the wrongdoing. The
mother’s motives are irrelevant.58 The mother’s position is
analogous to the corporation that commissioned the audit in
Hercules, not to the third party shareholders seeking to take
advantage of a service provided to others for a different
purpose.
Foreseeability is the limiting concept in ordinary
negligence law. Even if the involuntary parenthood claim were
57

In Cattanach, supra note 1 at paras 30-39 Gleeson J develops the
indeterminacy argument derived from the fact that a family might
claim damages for a broad range of items including gifts, weddings,
university education, and so on. The “ambit of wrongdoing” limit
does not address this concern. Gleeson’s examples illustrate more of a
potential problem of rule imprecision than of indeterminacy. The
same potential problem could exist in any future care assessment in a
serious personal injury case, and the courts have developed guidelines
to address it. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.

58

See L Millet in McFarlane, supra note 1 at 1003.
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described as one for pure economic loss, that does not in and of
itself change this. There is no functional or doctrinal
justification for replacing foreseeability with an “ambit of the
wrongdoing” approach in an involuntary parenthood case.
OFFSETTING BENEFITS
On the surface, the “offsetting benefits” position is the opposite
of the inherent “value of life” position. Courts that adopt the
offset position purport to accept that the plaintiffs are entitled
to full compensation for the cost of child rearing. However,
they set off the inherent benefit of raising a child. Although not
inevitable, in practice such courts assume that these benefits
meet or exceed the cost of raising a healthy child.59 They
therefore award nothing for the costs of raising a healthy child.
Damages for the extra exceptional cost of raising a child who
has special needs may, however, be compensable. Those who
take the “offsetting benefits” position arrive by a different route
at the same place as members of the “inherent value of life”
school of thought. It is not certain that they do so for different
reasons.
The “offsetting benefits” approach is another example
of employing a legal rule in an involuntary parenthood case
that is not used in standard negligence law. The benefits of
raising a child are largely non-pecuniary.60 By definition they
59

Quebec is a firm adherent to this approach. See Cataford c Moreau,
[1978] JQ no 302, 114 DLR (3d) 585 (Sup Ct); and Suite c Cooke,
supra note 44. The approach was rejected in Kealey, supra note 4 but
the court would have assessed the net benefit at zero had it adopted it.
According to L Bingham in Rees, supra note 1, no judge favoured the
net benefit approach in either McFarlane, supra note 1 or in
Cattanach, supra note 1.

60

There may be pecuniary benefits such as government support related
to child-rearing. None of the objections to offsetting non-pecuniary
benefits apply to these. One should insist only that these collateral
benefits are treated like collateral benefits in other cases, unless a
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cannot be measured accurately in money, even assuming
perfect information. A court may assign a monetary value to a
non-pecuniary benefit or loss, but the figure must be arbitrary
given the nature of the loss. In contrast, the costs of raising a
child are pecuniary. They may be difficult to quantify
accurately and fairly, perhaps particularly so in an involuntary
parenthood case, but in theory it can be done.61 The law ought
not to offset pecuniary losses with non-pecuniary benefits. Like
should be offset against like. The law does not offset an award
for lost earning capacity against the assumed joy of
unemployed leisure.62 The law would not reduce pecuniary
damages awarded under Fatal Accidents legislation if there
were evidence that the late husband was a nasty individual who
made his wife's life miserable.63 No precedent for offsetting
pecuniary damages with non-pecuniary benefits in negligence
has ever been cited in an involuntary parenthood case.
The conclusion that every child constitutes a net
benefit to parents is false. At best, it is an unproven
generalization. Every child does not generate “. . . innumerable
benefits in the form of personal satisfaction and happiness . .
.”64 for every parent. Pretending otherwise does not make it so.
Some unwilling parents will have chosen originally not to have
an additional child precisely because they anticipated that
another child would not bring them much joy. A fictional
compelling case for deviating from the general rule is made. See
Stockford, supra note 13 where it is assumed that deducting pecuniary
benefits is a simple exercise of the collateral source rule.
61

This is a legitimate concern, discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 94-97.

62

See Cattanach, supra note 1 per McHugh & Gummow JJ at paras 8590. This was criticized unconvincingly by Gleason CJ at para 37.

63

Stockford, supra note 13 at para 107.

64

Kealey, supra note 4 at para 82. Contra see J Ellis Cameron-Perry,
“Return of the burden of the ‘blessing’” (1999), 149 NLJ 1887.
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public transit passenger might think such parents misguided or
worse. But this is a lawful choice. The parents are better-placed
than the courts to assess the net benefits to them of having an
additional child. Then too, there are the children who “only a
mother could love.” Parents may love their children without
experiencing much parental satisfaction or happiness. They
may not love their child at all.
In theory, these problems might be addressed by
evidence. Courts do assess non-pecuniary damages and the
amounts awarded could be informed by evidence of
comparative loss. The same could be done with non-pecuniary
benefits. In several Canadian cases, when declining to
compensate for the cost of raising a child, the courts have
observed that the parents were in fact experiencing the joys of
child rearing.65 None have yet to deal with a parent testifying
that the child brought no joy, a realistic possibility, although it
would be distasteful and potentially damaging to the child. The
courts understandably do not want to adopt a rule that
encourages parents to give self-serving and symbolically
unattractive testimony that might well harm the child. More
fundamentally, if the law were to begin to refine the
quantification of the joys of parenthood, the law would be
treating a child, and for that matter, human life, like a
commodity. No court has ever indicated a desire to do so.
Most judges are aware of the legitimate difficulties of
attempting to quantify the value of parental satisfaction and joy
in individual cases. However, the decisions to refuse to
65

This seems to have been the dominant reason for denying care
damages in Kealey, supra note 4. Cf. Fredette v Wiebe (1986) 4
BCLR (2d) 184, 29 DLR (4th) 534, a case in which the mother
testified she would have wanted a child eventually, just not at the
time when she was a teenaged single mother. The reasons are unclear
but she may have recovered pecuniary damages, and did recover nonpecuniary damages, related to the accelerated birth.
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compensate because of the impossibility of quantifying, or to
simply assume that the benefits exceed or offset the cost of
raising the child, do not follow logically from these
difficulties.66 The pecuniary costs of child rearing can be
quantified as accurately in these cases as in standard personal
injury cases. The quantification difficulties arise from the
offsetting approach, not from the damages claim itself. The
logical solution is to follow the ordinary rules of negligence
law and to abandon entirely the futile attempt to offset nonpecuniary benefits.
It is interesting to speculate as to why some judges
conclude that the impossibility of making the offset approach
work justifies an assumption that there is a net benefit to child
rearing, as opposed to a perfect set-up or net loss. Perhaps they
believe that the benefits of child rearing should always
outweigh the costs, and that the state ought not to support
parents who feel otherwise. The offsetting benefits approach
could be employed in an effort to justify that decision. The
similarity to the inherent value of life school of thought is
evident in such an approach. Another possibility is that some
judges sincerely believe that the benefits of raising a child
always do in fact outweigh the costs. They would then have a
sincere belief in the risk of over-compensation.67 The question
remains why such a speculative and unquantifiable “risk” is
considered a more serious problem than ignoring patient
66

There are two variants of the argument. One is that there is a net
benefit. This is the Quebec approach. See supra note 60. The other is
that the impossibility of making the calculation in itself justifies
denying the claim. See eg L Millet in Rees, supra note 1 at para 111
taking issue with Lady Hales’ “deemed equilibrium” concept in
McFarlane, supra note 1.

67

This explanation is easier to reconcile with the otherwise illogical
decision to allow recovery for extra exceptional care costs related to
raising a child born with a disability, but not allowing for basic costs
of raising a child born healthy. See above section “Only Exceptional
Care Costs Allowed for Child Born with a Disability” at p 17.
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choice, under-compensating parents, and under-deterring
medical malpractice.
DUTY TO MITIGATE: ABORTION AND ADOPTION
Reproductive freedom could be a two-edged sword. If a
woman becomes pregnant against her wishes she will
sometimes, depending on local access problems, have the
option of undergoing a safe abortion. Of course the law cannot
require her to do so, but a few judges have observed that a
failure to abort or place the child for adoption could constitute
a failure to mitigate damages.68
It is understandable that no Canadian court has actually
recognized a duty to mitigate by abortion or adoption. In other
contexts, tort law is reluctant to impose duties to mitigate that
interfere with legitimate rights to make personal choices.69
Duties to mitigate are usually employed in a business context.70
A duty to mitigate by abortion is a particularly dangerous line
of argument. Abortion is an intensely personal matter. Few
judges, and certainly those who are in the “inherent value of
human life” school of thought, would wish the law to develop
rules that effectively and symbolically promoted abortion as

68

See e.g. Keats v Pearce [1984] NJ No 271, 48 Nfld & PEIR 102; and
Kealey, supra note 4 at para 87. In Leek v Vaidyanathan, 2011 ONCA
46, the court declined to resolve the question on a preliminary motion
holding a trial record was required to consider the question.

69

See e.g. the discussion on limits to the duty to mitigate in the context
of catastrophic injury in Canada’s leading personal injury damages
decision, Andrews v Grand & Toy Alberta,[1978] 2 SCR 229
[Andrews]

70

In a personal injury case the plaintiff must mitigate by making a
rational treatment choice, Janiak v Ippolito, [1985] 1 SCR 146. The
failure to terminate a pregnancy or place for adoption is unlikely to be
regarded as irrational.
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birth control.71 A requirement to mitigate by placing the child
for adoption avoids some of the abortion baggage. But it too
would thrust the court unnecessarily into the volatile and valueladen relationships amongst the state, women, and families.72
Finally, such a duty to mitigate would apply to
damages related to the pregnancy and birth itself, and also to
damages for the extra costs of raising a child born with a
disability. The duty to mitigate by abortion or adoption would
effectively eliminate entirely the action for involuntary
parenthood. Experience has shown us that few judges are
inclined to go that far.
CONVENTIONAL SUMS AND NON-PECUNIARY
DAMAGES
In 1999, the UK House of Lords (“UKHL”) held unanimously
71

The case for imposing a duty to mitigate by abortion may appear
stronger in wrongful birth cases which themselves arise from
negligently performed abortions. It might seem more difficult for a
mother in such a case to argue, for example, that she had principled
objections to abortion. This line of reasoning is false. There is no
factual basis to distinguish someone who has once elected an abortion
from someone who has not. See Fredette, supra note 65.

72

In McFarlane, supra note 1 L Steyn said:
I cannot conceive of any circumstances in which the autonomous
decision of the parents not to resort to even a lawful abortion
could be questioned. For similar reasons the parents' decision not
to have the child adopted was plainly natural and commendable.
It is difficult to envisage any circumstances in which it would be
right to challenge such a decision of the parents. The starting
point is the right of parents to make decisions on family planning
and, if those plans fail, their right to care for an initially
unwanted child. The law does and must respect these decisions
of parents which are so closely tied to their basic freedoms and
rights of personal autonomy.
See also Rees, supra note 1 at para 136 per L Scott.
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in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board that the cost of rearing a
healthy child was not recoverable.73 In 2001, the EWCA held
in Parkinson v. St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS
Trust that the mother could recover the additional costs of
raising a child born with severe disabilities.74 Parkinson was
not appealed. In 2003, the UKHL decided Rees v. Darlington
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust.75 Rees arose from a failed
sterilization undergone by a mother who had a serious visual
disability. She believed she would not be able to properly
parent a child should she give birth to one. Her child was born
healthy. The seven Lords in Rees unanimously affirmed the
decision in McFarlane to disallow claims for the cost of
rearing a healthy child.76
The holding in Parkinson was not in issue in Rees.
Nevertheless, the majority in Rees seems to have supported the
right to recover additional special care costs.77 Three of the
seven Lords would have distinguished Rees from McFarlane
and allowed the mother to recover the cost of raising a healthy
child.78 A majority of four would not allow the mother to
73

Supra note 1.

74

Supra note 18.

75

Supra note 1.

76

As will be evident from what follows, the impact of McFarlane,
supra note 1, is now mitigated because the mother will be entitled to
a £15,000 conventional sum according to the decision in Rees, supra
note 1 .

77

Rees, supra note 1 per L Steyn at para 35, L Hope at para 57, L
Hutton and para 91, and possibly L Scott at para 147. L Millet did not
find it necessary to decide. Strictly speaking, the holding in
Parkinson, supra note 18 was not at issue in Rees. L Bingham at para
8 and L Nichols at para 18 would not permit recovery for the extra
costs of care.

78

Rees, supra note 1 per L Steyn at para 48, per L Hope at para 78 &
per L Hutton at para 98.
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recover her pecuniary damages. This majority held that the
mother was entitled instead to recover a “conventional sum” of
£15,000 in recognition of the damage to her reproductive
autonomy.79 Two of those four would have preferred to
overrule Parkinson had that decision been in issue. They
favoured awarding only that conventional sum in all cases,
regardless of whether the claim was for ordinary child rearing
expenses, or for exceptional expenses related to special needs.80
L Bingham described the conventional award as follows:81
This solution is in my opinion consistent with
the ruling and rationale of McFarlane. The
conventional award would not be, and would not
be intended to be, compensatory. It would not be
the product of calculation. But it would not be a
nominal, let alone a derisory, award. It would
afford some measure of recognition of the wrong
done. And it would afford a more ample
measure of justice than the pure McFarlane rule.
It is difficult to regard the conventional sum approach
as anything other than an attempt to find a compromise
amongst the strongly competing positions found in the
involuntary parenthood case law.82 There is nothing inherently
79

Rees, supra note 1 per L Bingham at para 8, per L Nichols at para 17,
per L Millet at para 125, & per L Scott at para 148.

80

Rees, supra note 1, per L Bingham at para 9, & per L Nicholls at para
18.

81

Rees, supra note 1 at para 8.

82

The HL has never been keen to reverse its previous decisions.
McFarlane, supra note 1 had been decided only a few years earlier.
Subsequent to the arguments, but before the decision in Rees, supra
note 1, the majority of the HC of Australia had rejected McFarlane in
Cattanach, supra note 1. L Steyn at para 46 made it clear he regarded
the conventional sum approach as an attempt to circumvent
McFarlane.
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wrong with compromise, provided it is scrutinized as such. In
assessing this compromise it is important to keep in mind what
L Steyn called the “heterodox nature of the proposed
solution”83 and to recall the concern expressed earlier about
deviating from ordinary tort rules, especially when doing so
has a discriminatory impact.
On the surface, awarding a conventional sum appears
to be a win-win solution. The mother’s right to reproductive
autonomy was symbolically affirmed in eloquent prose by L
Bingham. It was recognized with an award of damages. Those
who believe that the birth of a child can never be the subject of
damages should also be satisfied. This approach severs
completely the mother’s recovery from the cost of rearing the
child. This is what Rees really stands for.
The problem is that the mother was not fully
compensated. Indeed, the UKHL would not even admit that she
was entitled to compensation. And as discussed earlier, the
inherent value of life argument does not logically support
limiting the mother’s claim in the first place.
There seem to be only two senses in which this can be
called a “win-win” situation. The first is to regard it as a fresh
approach to the setoff exercise. The court would be recognizing
that there is a net cost to raising a healthy child. What would be
new is that setoff of non-pecuniary benefits would be less than
the full cost of care. No one in Rees supported the conventional
award on this basis. The setoff approach is inherently flawed.
Adjusting the arbitrary numbers does not change this.
Alternatively, this conventional sum could be called a
“win” on purely pragmatic grounds. Mothers would have to
accept that whatever the merits of their claim, this is as good as
it is going to get. Something is better than nothing. Although it
83

See Rees, supra note 1 per L Steyn at para 45.
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is far less than the cost of raising a healthy child, £15,000 is not
a derisory sum.
Pragmatic compromise is the essence of tort law. The
overwhelming majority of cases are settled one way or another.
There was nothing stopping the parties in Rees from settling for
£15,000. However, a judicially imposed compromise of this
sort is unheard of. As L Steyn pointed out, there is no authority
for adopting the conventional sum approach in the UK or
elsewhere.84 Judicial decisions are not compromises, in legal
theory or in fact. The principled application of legal rules may
well result in each party achieving something. The defendant
may be found negligent, but recovery reduced because the
plaintiff’s own negligence contributes to the loss, for example.
That is quite different from a court adopting a rule that
effectively tries to give something to everyone because the
judges cannot agree on who is entitled to what.
In Rees, L Hope raised a different objection to the
conventional sum approach. He explained the role of
conventional sums in assessing claims for general damages in
UK law. Some damages are not capable of monetary
quantification so conventional sums are used to establish a
comparative, if arbitrary, scale of loss.85 He then pointed out
that the effect of the conventional sum approach in Rees was to
reject the quantifiable claims for special damages and allow
recovery only for the non-quantifiable general damages.86 This

84

Rees, supra note 1 at para 46. He also felt it was impermissible for a
court to adopt this solution.

85

One problem with this critique is that a fixed conventional sum for
each case eliminates the comparative injury approach which is the
very reason for conventional awards according to L Hope.

86

Rees, supra note 1 at paras 70-74.
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he found objectionable.87 It is not certain that L Bingham
would have accepted this description of his conventional sum
solution, let alone intended it. It does appear, however, that this
is exactly what the courts of British Columbia have done.
A remarkable thing happened in British Columbia on
July 14 and July 15, 2004. Decisions in Bevilacqua v.
Altenkirk,88 and then in Roe v. Dabbs,89 were released in the
Supreme Court by two different judges. Both were involuntary
parenthood decisions involving claims for the cost of rearing a
healthy child. Neither decision was referred to in the other. By
striking coincidence, the novel reasons for judgment in each
were virtually identical.
Both judges held that the parents were entitled to
compensation, but that the cost of raising a healthy child was
not a true measure of the loss. Rather, the parents were to be
compensated for their non-pecuniary losses flowing from the
involuntary parenthood. Significantly, both judges were
convinced that awarding the cost of care without offsetting the
non-pecuniary benefits would over-compensate the parents.90
87

The point would have to be made differently in Canada. The Supreme
Court of Canada has eliminated the various types of general damages
that L Hope was describing. Instead, it established a global head of
non-pecuniary loss capped at $100,000 in 1978 CAD. The court also
rejected the comparative loss criterion for determining the amount.
Instead, non-pecuniary damages were supposed to be quantified
based on the plaintiff’s need for solace. See Andrews, supra note 69.

88

Supra note 11.

89

Roe v Dabbs, 2004 BCSC 957, [2004] BCJ No 1485.

90

Bevilacqua, supra note 11 at para 115; Roe, ibid at 196-201.
Certainly there was no over-compensation in the end result. In Roe,
after looking at damage awards in similar cases (which were assessed
on different bases) the court awarded $55,000 in non-pecuniary
damages to the mother. Making similar comparisons in Bevilacqua,
the court awarded “. . . $30,000 to Mrs. Bevilacqua, the bulk of
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However, they both recognized the practical difficulties with
the offset approach.
In denying pecuniary damages, the BC courts reasoned
that the cost of rearing a healthy child did not constitute a loss,
but rather a redistribution of family resources. In their opinion,
the family does not have fewer resources after the tort. They
believe that the negligence merely redistributes resources
among family members to account for the costs occasioned by
the new child. It is true that an unplanned child does not
necessarily reduce family income.91 It increases family
expenses. This is a loss. This line of argument does not
advance the case for denying recovery one bit. It is simply a
more cumbersome, if apparently more orthodox method of
seeking compromise than the conventional sum approach.
In fairness, in Bevilacqua Globerman J does an
excellent job of raising different, but related and legitimate
concerns. 92 It is true that the amount that a parent may elect to
spend on rearing a child is determined in part by parental
choice about how to allocate family resources. Some parents
may see university education as a necessity and others not. The
law cannot regard unconstrained parental choice as the basis
upon which to quantify damages caused by the tortfeasor.
There must be some objective test or measure to control for
this.
One possible solution could be to adopt the "Actual
which would be to compensate her for pregnancy and childbirth” and
$20,000 to the father, “primarily to compensate him for the
readjustments he has had to make in response to the financial burdens
of providing for [the child].” Supra note 11 at 214
91

This ignores the reduction in income incurred if one or both parents
reduce their earnings to make time to care for the child.

92

Supra note 9 at paras 124-143.
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Anticipated Expenditure” approach. This could rely on
aggregate data about what level of expenditure a family of a
particular size with a particular income typically spends on
raising an additional child.93 Such a combination of objective
and subjective measure of loss is not unknown in personal
injury cases.94 It is also true, however, that the AAE approach
favours wealthier parents who may elect to devote more
resources to rearing a child than those parents who lack the
resources to do so. At some point the elusive line between loss
and investment benefit becomes of concern. There is much to
be said for limiting recovery by some objective measure
independent of family wealth. Of course, there is much to be
said for that in other areas of tort law as well.
The solution to these difficulties according to the
decisions in Bevilacqua and Roe is to deny the claim for
pecuniary loss altogether and to award modest amounts for
non-pecuniary damages. This was correctly criticized by L
Hope in Rees.95 It under-compensates the plaintiffs. It allows
the court to pull a number out of a hat with no foundation, and
leaves no objective basis for an appeal as to quantum. It
employs a comparative loss approach to non-pecuniary
damages that has been rejected by the Supreme Court of
Canada.96 There is a better way. The courts could employ data
about what the average Canadian family of a certain size
regardless of income would spend rearing an additional child.
Or, the courts could adopt an evidence-based conventional sum
to compensate for the pecuniary cost of raising a child. Either
of these solutions would address the legitimate quantification
93

Bevilacqua, supra note 9 at para 124.

94

For example, in Andrews, supra note 69, the court used government
data to determine what percentage of income the average Canadian
spent on basic necessities.
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Rees, supra note 1 at paras 70-74.
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Andrews, supra note 69.
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difficulties, and reduce the need for costly, unreliable expert
evidence. The actual awards for the ordinary costs of rearing a
healthy child would probably be much less than usually
assumed.97
CONCLUSION
Only a single Canadian court has yet approved recovery in an
involuntary parenthood case for the full cost of raising a
child.98 Other Canadian courts have adopted no fewer than five
different rules to limit such damages. The uncertainty in the
law is unacceptable. In each of the limiting cases the damage
limit was exceptional in that no such limit is employed in any
other area of negligence law. As such, in each case the damage
limit discriminates against parents, particularly mothers. These
limits effectively require parents to subsidize medical
malpractice.
97

For example, in Cattanach, supra note 1 the parents were granted
about $100,000 CAD for child rearing. See Gleeson CJ at para 17. In
Kealey, supra note 4, had the court recognized the claims, child
rearing costs would have been assessed at about $140,000.
Christopher Sarlo argues that it is possible to raise a child on about
$3,000-$4,000 a year, and even less if parents only include necessary
expenses and are careful with their dollars. Christopher A Sarlo, The
Cost of Raising Children, online: The Fraser Institute <
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/
research-news/research/publications/MeasuringCostChildren.pdf>.
Sarlo’s estimates do not include the cost of child care. Other
estimates run between $10,000 and $20,000/ year depending on
several variables. See e.g. United States Department of Agriculture,
USDA Cost of Raising a Child Calculator, online: USDA Center for
Nutrition Policy and Promotion <http://www.cnpp.usda.gov>. Paul
Henman, Updated Costs of Raising Children – September Quarter
2012, (The University of Queensland: Social Policy Unit, School of
Social Work and Human Services) estimated the total costs at about
$200,000 AUD. To date there is no clear position about an
entitlement to damages for losses incurred by a parent choosing to
leave the workforce to care for the child.
98

Stockford, supra note 13.
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The more interesting question is how the law ever
developed as it did, contorting one accepted rule of negligence
law after another. There are legitimate concerns about how to
measure the costs of child care, and more fundamentally about
whether these costs are a proper measure of damages. But most
of these difficulties are not unique to involuntary parenthood
cases, and others are amenable to ready solution. They do not
warrant denying or drastically restricting the parents’ claims.
Instead the “solutions” have proven worse than the initial
concerns. Parents should be entitled to recover the foreseeable
costs of raising any child born in an involuntary parenthood
situation, subject to an appropriate limiting principle to reflect
the fact that parents cannot be allowed to effectively determine
their own subjective standard of child care.
There is no denying that some judges do not accept
that a woman has a right to reproductive freedom, a right to not
have a child. Nor do some accept that this right should be
protected by ordinary negligence law. Involuntary parenthood
actions seem too often to provide another opportunity for
opponents and proponents of reproductive freedom to stage
real and symbolic battles. So far, the mothers, the fathers and
their children are losing to the medical profession. What an odd
script.
The child awards in the typical involuntary parenthood
case are likely to be too small to justify an unsuccessful party
in mounting an appeal.99 The stakes in a defective birth control
pill class action will more than justify either side pursuing
appeals, even to the Supreme Court if they get leave. There is
no reason that the ultimate judicial rulings on damages for the
cost of raising a child will differ in the class actions from in the
malpractice cases. There is a reasonable prospect that the
appellate courts will finally endorse a standard tort law
approach to damages for child care in involuntary parenthood
99

Supra note 97.
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actions. However, the Australian experience shows us that the
issue may not ultimately be settled by the courts. The same
arguments that have been raised against full recovery in the
courts may arise again in the legislatures. In addition, as in
Australia, we may see a legislative determination to protect
product
manufacturers,
especially
pharmaceutical
manufacturers, from the consequences of their negligence.100
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Supra note 12.

